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A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based
Security Scheme for Wireless
Networks
Michael Ekonde Sone
Abstract
This chapter presents a new cross-layer security scheme which deploys efficient
coding techniques in the physical layer in an upper layer classical cryptographic
protocol system. The rationale in designing the new scheme is to enhance security-
throughput trade-off in wireless networks which is in contrast to existing schemes
which either enhances security at the detriment of data throughput or vice versa.
The new scheme is implemented using the residue number system (RNS), non-
linear convolutional coding and subband coding at the physical layer and RSA
cryptography at the upper layers. The RNS reduces the huge data obtained from
RSA cryptography into small parallel data. To increase the security level, iterated
wavelet-based subband coding splits the ciphertext into different levels of decom-
position. At subsequent levels of decomposition, the ciphertext from the preceding
level serves as data for encryption using convolutional codes. In addition, through-
put is enhanced by transmitting small parallel data and the bit error correction
capability of non-linear convolutional code. It is shown that, various passive and
active attacks common to wireless networks could be circumvented. An FPGA
implementation applied to CDMA could fit into a single Virtex-4 FPGA due to small
parallel data sizes employed.
Keywords: residue number system (RNS), RSA cryptography, field programmable
gate array (FPGA), subband coding, convolutional coding, CDMA
1. Introduction
Generally, wireless networks consist of low capacity links with nodes that rely
on batteries. An efficient communication scheme for such networks should mini-
mize both congestion in the links and control information in the nodes. Security is a
critical parameter in wireless applications and any efficient communication scheme
has to integrate security vulnerabilities of the system in its implementation. Unfor-
tunately, existing schemes have network security implemented at the upper layer
such as the application layer; meanwhile parameters such as congestion, which
affect data throughput, are the physical layer. Hence, any attempt to increase the
security level in a communication system greatly compromises data throughput. In
[1], the authors developed a metric to estimate a timeframe for cyberattacks using
the RSA public key cryptography. In the analysis, the authors estimated the
attacker’s human time in carrying out a successful attack based on the key length.
1
Such an implementation at the upper layer will curb any security attack at the
prescribed time but will greatly compromise data throughput at the physical layer
due to the huge modular exponentiation involved in its implementation. In [2], the
authors developed a secure and efficient method for mutual authentication and key
agreement protocol with smart cards. The implementation, which is based on the
constant updating of the password, will involve a considerable amount of control
information, which is detrimental to the optimum functioning of the nodes.
Research work using different information-theoretic models to develop physical
layer security based on the characteristics of the wireless links has been carried out
[3, 4]. However, the existing methods for implementing physical layer security
under the different information-theoretic security models is expensive and requires
assumptions about the communication channels that may not be accurate in prac-
tice [5]. Hence any deployment of the physical-layer security protocol to supple-
ment a well-established upper layer security scheme will be a pragmatic approach
for robust data transmission and confidentiality [6]. It is in this light that, a new
cross-layer approach is presented in this research. Major research efforts have
targeted cross-layer implementation of security schemes in wireless networks [7–9].
In this research, the proposed cross-layer security scheme uses signal processing
techniques as well as efficient coding and well-established cryptographic algorithm
to implement a security scheme, which greatly enhances security-throughput trade-
off, and curb many security threats common to wireless networks.
The rest of the chapter is organized in eight subsequent sections. In Section 2, we
present the background knowledge required for the design and implementation of
the new cross layer security scheme. This will involve a review of the different
techniques used in the development of the new security scheme. The first subsec-
tion presents the implementation of the multi-level convolutional cryptosystem.
This implementation involves the combination of subband coding and a new non-
linear convolutional coding. Next, a review of the residue number system (RNS)
with brief description of the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) is presented. We
conclude the section with an overview of RSA public-key cryptography. Section 3
presents the protocol for the implementation of the new cross layer security
scheme. The FPGA-based implementation applied to CDMA using the new layered
security scheme will be presented in Section 4. In Section 5, cryptanalysis of the
cross-layer security scheme will be carried out in order to quantify the security.
Quantification of data throughput is performed in section 6 while different security
threats which could be circumvented by the cross-layer security scheme are
presented in Section 7. We end the chapter in Section 8 with conclusions of our
work.
2. Background
This section presents the background knowledge required for the design and
implementation of the new cross layer security scheme. It involves a review of the
different techniques used in the development of the new security scheme.
2.1 Multi-level convolutional cryptosystem
The multi-level convolutional cryptosystem constitutes the second stage of
implementation at the physical layer. It receives integers from the RNS
implemented at the first stage. The multi-level cryptosystem is implemented using
subband coding and non-linear convolutional cryptosystem.
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2.1.1 Subband coding
The integers from the RNS block are split into different levels of decomposition
based on subband coding. Subband coding is implemented using integer wavelet
lifting scheme [10, 11]. It is shown in [15] that, a judicious choice of filter banks
could result into an integer transform despite the fact that, wavelet transform is an
approximation process. A four-tap Daubechies polyphase matrix, which results into
integer transforms, is given as follows [15]:
Pnew zð Þ ¼ he zð Þ g
new
e zð Þ
ho zð Þ gnewo zð Þ
 
(1)
where h and g are filter coefficients with suffix e and o denoting even and odd
coefficients. The factorization of the polyphase matrix is as follows [12, 13, 15].
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(Eq. (2)) forms the basis of integer to integer wavelet transform which in effect
is progressive transmission. The factored coefficients h1 ¼ 
ffiffiffi
3
p
, h2 ¼
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2
p are used to compute the approximate and detail
sequences. In such transmission, the original data is split into two portions, namely
approximate and detail sequences. The detail sequence is transmitted while the
approximate sequence is further split into two halves. The process is repeated until
the final data point. Using (Eq. (2)), the approximate, an and the detail, dn
sequences could be computed as follows [14, 15]:
anj jmj ¼ x2l h1j jmj þ x2l‐1
 
mj
: h2


mj
þ x2l‐1


mj
dnj jmj ¼ x2l h1j jmj þ x2l‐1
 
mj
þ an‐1


mj
(3)
where an and dn are the approximation and detail sequences of wavelet coeffi-
cients of the nth sample. The subsequent transmissions are fed into the non-linear
convolutional coding block as depicted in Figure 1 for the first level kth detail and
Figure 1.
Synopsis for the computation of the kth coefficients for the 1st and 2nd levels of decomposition.
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approximation sequences [14, 15]. The processing blocks (PEs) shown in the figure
depicts the computations of (Eq. (3)).
The final decomposition level which comprises one data point will give one
approximation coefficient and one detail coefficient.
At the destination, the inverse wavelet transform is performed to obtain the
successive approximation sequences. (Eq. (3)) is used to perform the inverse trans-
form by reversing the operations for the forward transform and flipping signs
[14, 15]. The process starts with the approximation and detail coefficients a0 and d0
respectively obtained at the final decomposition level of the forward transform. The
first stage of the inverse transform is shown in Figure 2 [14, 15].
The (↑2) symbol represents upsampling by 2, which means that zeros are
inserted between samples while H2 and H3 are the filter coefficients used in (Eq. (3)).
2.1.2 Nonlinear convolutional cryptosystem
A major advantage of symmetric cryptography is the ability of composing prim-
itives to produce stronger ciphers although on their own the primitives will be
weak. Hence, the vulnerable convolutional code block will be cascaded into differ-
ent stages using the product ciphers obtained from the S-box and P-box to form a
non-linear convolutional cryptosystem.
• Key generation: The specifications of the private keys used in the
implementation of the cascaded convolutional cryptosystem are as follows
[14, 15, 19]:
a. States of each transducer or convolutional code block in the cascade given
by the contents of the sub-matrices in the generator matrix;
b.The transition functions. These are mappings used to compare the input
bits and present state and switches to the appropriate next state;
c. n-bit S-boxes. They are used to shuffle the output bits.
d.n-bit P-boxes. They are used for the different permutations per level of
decomposition.
For illustrative purposes, an (8, 8, 2) convolutional encoder will be considered to
demonstrate the keys generation process.
Figure 2.
The first stage of the inverse transform.
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2.1.2.1 States of convolutional code block or transducer
For an 8  8 matrix, there are at least 216 ways or keys in which the connections
of a register to the modulo-2 adder could be made. A possible key which gives the
contents of the 8  8 matrix are shown in (Eq. (4))
ð4Þ
The generator matrix is used to specify the following set of 8 vectors.
X(7) := A1(7) ⊕ A3(7); X(6) := A1(7) ⊕ A1(6) ⊕ A3(6).
X(5) := A1(5) ⊕ A3(5) ⊕ A3(6); X(4) := A1(4) ⊕ A3(4) ⊕ A3(5).
X(3) := A1(3) ⊕ A3(3) ⊕ A3(4); X(2) := A1(2) ⊕ A3(2) ⊕ A3(3).
X(1) := A1(1) ⊕ A3(1); X(0) := A1(0) ⊕ A3(0).
It should be recalled that, for an (n,k,L) convolutional encoder, each vector
has Lk dimensions and contains the connections of the encoder to the modulo-2
adder.
The structure of the (8, 8, 2) convolutional encoder is shown in Figure 3 with
A2, A3 representing the registers M11,M
1
2 while A1 represents the input data.
2.1.2.2 The transition functions
For an (8,8,2) convolutional code, there are 28 = 256 mappings or keys. There are
two sets of transition functions denoted as f1 for the two possible states.
For example, a transition function that compares input data to state 1 and
remains in state 1 is given as follows:
f1 1; 00000000½ ; 00000001½ ; 00000010½ ; 00000011½ ; 00000100½ ;fð
00000101½ ; 00000110½ ; 00000111½ gÞ ¼ 1f g (5)
In (Eq. (5)), if the input data is any of the sequences {[00000000],
[00000001], [00000010], [00000011], [00000100], [00000101], [00000110],
[00000111]}, the present state of the transducer which is state 1 is retained.
Figure 3.
Structure of an (8, 8, 2) convolutional encoder.
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A transition function that compares input data to state 1 and switches to state 2 is
given as follows:
f1 1; 00001000½ ; 00001001½ ; 00001010½ ; 00001011½ ; 00001100½ ;fð
00001101½ ; 00001110½ ; 00001111½ gÞ ¼ 2f g, (6)
In (Eq. (6)), if the input data is any of the sequences {[00001000], [00001001],
[00001010], [00001011], [00001100], [00001101], [00001110], [00001111]}, the
present state of the transducer which is state 1 is changed to state 2.
At the destination, the transition functions are similar to those for the encoder at
the source but change roles. The transition functions are very critical in the imple-
mentation of convolutional cryptosystem since it accounts for its dynamic nature,
hence an increase in security level.
2.1.2.3 S-box entries
For an (8,8,2) convolutional code, using 2-bit shuffling boxes, there are 16 S-
boxes or keys. For higher n-bit shuffling boxes, the number of keys increases, for
example 8-bit shuffling boxes will give 28 keys. The four 2-bit S-boxes used to
illustrate the scheme are shown in Table 1. Given an 8-bit data sequence as [A7, A6,
A5, A4, A3, A2, A1, A0], the look-up S-box, Sub1,1 is used to shuffle the first pair of
bits, [A7, A6], Sub1,2 is used to shuffle the second pair [A5, A4], Sub1,3 is used to
shuffle the third pair [A3, A2], and Sub1,4 is used to shuffle the last pair [A1, A0].
2.1.2.4 P-box entries
The interconnections between inputs and outputs are implemented using a
permutation set look-up table. For an (8,8,2) code, the eight (08) inputs and out-
puts could be permuted or interconnected in at least 77 = 823,543 ways. A permissi-
ble permutation is shown in Table 2 [14, 15].
Table 1.
2-bit shuffle look-up-table.
Table 2.
Input–output interconnect look-up-table for encoder.
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After the specification of the keys, the vulnerable convolutional code block will
be cascaded into different stages using the product ciphers obtained from the S-box
and P-box. Using two (02) stages, a non-linear (8, 8, 2) 2-cascaded is as shown in
Figure 4.
In Figure 4, Sub1,1, Sub1,2, Sub1,3 and Sub1,4 are S-boxes used for pairwise bit
shuffling and the input vector to the first transducer, {X7, X6, X5, X4, X3, X2, X1, X0}
is the output set from the subband encoding block while the output vector {Y7, Y6,
Y5, Y4, Y3, Y2, Y1, Y0} is the ciphertext from the second transducer stage.
It is worth noting that the security level could be greatly increased by increasing
the number of stages to be cascaded.
2.2 Residue number system (RNS)
The residue number system uses the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) to
compute unknown values from the remainders left or residues when unknown
values are divided by known numbers.
The modular Chinese remainder theorem states that [16, 17]:
Assume m1, m2, …, mN are positive integers, relatively prime pairs: (mi, mk) = 1
if i # k. Let {b1, b2, …, bN} be arbitrary integers, then the system of simultaneous
linear congruence
x1 ¼ b1 mod m1ð Þ    xN ¼ bN mod mNð Þ (7)
Figure 4.
Initial structure of the cascade before encoding.
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has exactly one solution modulo the product m1, m2, …, mN. The solution to the
simultaneous linear congruence is formally given as [14, 16, 17].
xj jM ¼ ∑
L
j¼1
m^j
xj
m^j


mj
: xj


M
(8)
where m^j ¼ Mmj and M ¼
QN
j¼1
mj.
(Eq. (8)) establishes the uniqueness of the solution. In this research, the integers
Tj ¼ ∣ xjm^ j ∣ often referred to as the multiplicative inverses of m^j are computed a priori
by solving the linear congruence in (Eq. (7)). In other words, if Mj = M/mj, then
the multiplicative inverses, Tj are computed by solving the congruence TjMj = 1
(mod mj).
2.3 RSA public-key cryptography
• Key creation
◦ Choose secrete primes p and q and compute m = p.q
◦ Choose encryption exponent, e
◦ Compute d satisfying e.d  1 mod ((p – 1). (q – 1)).
◦ Public key: (m, e) and Private key: d
• Security services achieved using RSA cryptography are authentication and
non-repudiation based on digital signatures and confidentiality based on
encryption. Implementation of these services are summarized in Table 3
3. Protocol of implementation of cross-layer security scheme
The new scheme is implemented at the application and physical layers. The
detail operations of the application and physical layers at the source and destination
are as follows:
• Source:
◦ Application layer:
a. Traditional RSA encryption
◦ Physical layer:
a. Step 1: Residue number system (RNS) converts the message points into
residues based on the moduli set;
Authentication and non-repudiation Confidentiality
Choose plaintext X.
Compute Xs  Xd (mod m)
Send (X, Xs) to Alice. Xs is the RSA digital signature of
message, X
Choose plaintext X.
Use Bob’s public key (m, e) to
compute
C  Xe (mod m).
Send ciphertext, C to Bob
Table 3.
Summary of security services of RSA public-key cryptography.
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b.Step 2: RNS-based RSA ciphertext is converted into different levels of
decomposition using subband coding;
c. Step 3: Symmetric encryption using Convolutional cryptosystem;
At the destination, the entire process is reversed startingwith convolutional
decoding at the physical layer and endingwith RSA decryption at the application layer.
3.1 Illustrative example
Consider an arbitrary array of integers for plaintext as follows {398, 453, 876,
200, 356, 165, 265, 897}.
• Source
◦ Application layer: Traditional RSA encryption
a. Primes, p = 13; q = 37) n = p. q = 481
b.Encryption key, e = 5
c. Decryption key: e. d  1 mod (432)) d = 173
Array due to RSA encryption is given as {151, 293, 252, 135, 304, 315, 265, 182}
◦ Physical layer:
a. Step 1: Moduli set of {107, 109, 113} is used to convert the RSA
ciphertext into 8-bit data point arrays. The residue set, r1 for m1 = 107 is
as follows:
r1 = {44, 79, 38, 28, 90, 101, 51, 75}
b.Step 2: Subband coding is performed to split residues obtained using
moduli set into three levels of decomposition since m = 8 = 23 data
points are used. Subband coding is basically down sampling by 2 using
(Eq. (3)). The corresponding arrays for the first level of decomposition
are as follows:
r11 = {9, 48, 79, 27};  r12 = {9, 42, 75, 21};  r13 = {9, 30,
67, 9}
Note that r11 refers to first level of decomposition array for modulus,
m1 = 107 and the first element is obtained using (Eq. (3)) with integer lifting
filter coefficients set, h = {2, 0, 0} as follows: r1(1) – 2  r1(0) = 79–
2  44 = 9.
The same procedure is performed for the second and third levels of
decomposition.
c. Step 3: Table 4 summarizes the manual computation of the encryption
and decryption process of the convolutional cryptosystem for the data
r11(0) = 9 from the subband encoding stage based on the entries of
the product cipher and combinational logic of the non-linear (8,8,2)
2-cascaded convolutional transducer in Figure 4.
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• Destination
◦ Physical layer:
The entire process is reversed starting with convolutional decoding at the physical
layer which was illustrated in Table 4.
a. Subband decoding: It involves upsampling and the use of quadrature
mirror filter (QMF) bank as depicted in Figure 5 [12, 15]
The (↑2) symbol represents upsampling by 2, which means that zeros are
inserted between samples. The QMF bank are the coefficients derived from the
4-tap Daubechies filter bank [12, 15, 20]. Hence, using upsampling and the QMF
bank coefficients the residue sets r1, r2 and r3 are retrieved.
Figure 5 will be used to perform a numerical illustration of subband decoding
for the first level of decomposition of the array of modulus m1 = 107 to obtain
approximation coefficients a1.
The moduli sets obtained from subband encoding for the three levels of decom-
position for m1 = 107 are as follows:
- Level 3: r31 = {2, 44};  Level 2: r21 = {50, 20};  Level 1: r11 = {9, 48,
79, 27}.
For subband decoding, the entire process is reversed with level 3 of encoding
becoming level 1 for decoding.
Table 4.
Manual computation for the first sample of first level of decomposition for modulus 107.
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r31 from subband encoding namely a0 = 2 and d0 = 44 is used. From Figure 5,
upsampling performed on the approximation, a0 and detail, d0 data points gives the
sets y_1 = {2, 0} and z_1 = {44, 0} respectively. Using 4-tap Daubechies integer
lifting filter coefficients set, h = {2, 0, 0} we have.
w_1(0) = z_1(0) – h(2)*y_1(0) – h(3)*y_1(1) = 44–0 – 0 = 44
w_1(1) = z_1(1) – h(2)*y_1(0) – h(3)*y_1(1) = 0–0 – 0 = 0
a_1(0) = y_1(0) – h(1)*w_1(0) = 2–2*44 = 86
a_1(1) = y_1(1) – h(1)*w_1(1) = 0–2*0 = 0
Hence the first level approximation data points, a1 are obtained as follows.
a1(0) = w_1(0) = 44 and a1(1) = w_1(1) + z_1(0) = 0–86 = 86
) a1 = {44, 86}.
The process is repeated to obtain the second and third levels approximation
data points. The third level approximation data points, a3 should be equal to
residue set, r1 obtained from the RNS-based RSA ciphertext using the modulus,
m1 = 107.
b.RNS-based Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT): It is applied to the residue sets
r1, r2 and r3.
(Eq. (8))will be used to retrieve the RSA ciphertext from the residue sets. Using
(Eq. (8)) and moduli set, m = {107, 109, 113} to compute the first data point of the
ciphertext set we have.
X  r11  m^1  T1ð Þ r21  m^2  T2ð Þ r31  m^3  T3ð Þ mod Mð Þ
 44 12; 317  9ð Þ þ 42 12;091 68ð Þ þ 38 11; 663 33ð Þð Þ mod 1; 317; 919ð Þ
) X ¼ 151
The same process is repeated to obtain all the other data points of the RSA
ciphertext set. The RSA ciphertext set is fed to the RSA decryption block at the
application layer.
◦ Application layer: RSA decryption
Decryption of the first data point is given as M = 151d mod n = 151173 mod
481 = 398 which represents the original data which was sent at the source.
The same process is repeated to obtain all the other data points of the
plaintext set.
Figure 5.
The first two stages of the wavelet inverse transform.
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4. FPGA implementation of security scheme applied to CDMA
In this section, FPGA implementation of new scheme applied to CDMA, the new
VHDL code package to implement A mod n operations, synthesis report and
behavioral simulation results will be presented.
4.1 FPGA implementation of new scheme applied to CDMA
Code division multiple access (CDMA) enables several users to transmit mes-
sages simultaneously over the same channel bandwidth in such a way that each
transmitter/ receiver user pair has its own distinct signature code for transmitting
over the common channel bandwidth. This distinct signature is ensured by using
spread spectrum techniques whereby the message from each user is transmitted
using orthogonal waveforms. In orthogonal signaling, the residues are mapped to
orthogonal waveforms which constitute the CDMA signal [23]. The orthogonal
waveforms used in this research are Walsh functions.
Considering an (8, 8, 2) multi-level cryptosystem for illustrative purposes, the
mapping process will involve M = 28 = 256 orthogonal waveforms. Using the
dynamic range of (128, 126), a set of M = 28 = 256 orthogonal waveforms is
required to completely represent all the integers or symbols. Based on this, the
corresponding Hadamard matrix obtained from the procedure elaborated in [21] is
as follows:
H256 ¼ H128 ⊗ H128
¼
H128 H128
H128 H128
 !
The H256 matrix is a large matrix comprising of 256 rows and 256 columns. The
Hadamard matrix results into a multi–dimensional array. Multi–dimensional arrays
are arrays with more than one index. Multi–dimensional arrays are not allowed for
hardware synthesis. One way around this is to declare two one–dimensional array
types. This approach is easier to use and more representative of actual hardware.
The VHDL code used to declare the two one–dimensional array types is shown in
Figure 6 [22].
The other operations in the hardware Walsh function generator implementation
are trivial since they involve modulo–2 addition with built–in operators in VHDL
code to handle such operations.
4.2 New VHDL code package
In this research, a new algorithm is presented which implements modular expo-
nentiation without the use of the Montgomery algorithm. A package is developed in
the VHDL code to extract residues similarly to the X mod N operation for any
randomly generated data. Meanwhile, the large operand lengths which resulted
Figure 6.
VHDL code for synthesizable 256  256 Hadamard matrix.
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from the modular exponentiation are reduced using binary exponentiation and
the RNS.
The principle used to develop the package is as follows:
To perform the x = X mod N calculation where X has a large operand length of b
bits say b = 1024 bits and N is modulus of small operand length of b1 bits say b1 = 8
bits, the following steps are used:
1. X is converted to binary equivalent;
2. The b1 least significant bits of the b bits of X are chosen;
3. The integer equivalent, x1 of the chosen b1 bits is determined;
4. The residue, x = X mod N is obtained from the following equation;
x ¼ x1 þ 2b11 N
  X
2b11
(9)
5. If the residue, x is greater than the modulus, N the process is iterated until the
residue is less than the modulus.
(Eq. (9)) forms the basis for the x = X mod N calculation.
Based on this new algorithm which implements modular exponentiation without
the use of the Montgomery algorithm, the entire physical layer security scheme
could fit into a single FPGA chip.
4.3 Behavioral simulation and synthesis report
In order to verify the performance of the proposed architecture, a VHDL
programme was written and implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA chip (device:
xc4vlx 200, package: ff 1513, speed grade 11) [22]. Sixteen (16) randomly generated
integers were fed into the FPGA. For this value, the number of bonded IOBs is 760 out
of 960 resulting to 79% resource used. The behavioral simulation results for array
{39,870, 45,378, 87,654, 20,087, 35,689, 16,592, 564, 276,509, 89,732, 56,287, 4527,
89,065, 4321, 7654, 5489, 512} using moduli set {111, 115, 119} are displayed in [14].
In [14], the complete synthesis report showing device utilization summary is
presented. Due to the additional implementation of orthogonal signaling compared
to the implementation in [14], the following parameters are different compared to
results displayed in [14]:
The device utilization summary is as follows:
• Number of slices: 5411 out of 89,088 6%
• Number of slice flip flops: 60 out of 178,176 0%
• Number of four input LUTs: 7452 out of 178,176 4%
• Total REAL time to Router completion: 24 min 7 s.
• Total REAL time to place and route (PAR) completion: 24 min 41 s.
• Pin delays less than 1.00 ns: 21928 out of 30,651 71.5%.
13
A New Cross-Layer FPGA-Based Security Scheme for Wireless Networks
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82390
5. Cryptanalysis of cross-layer scheme
The cryptanalysis will be performed separately at the application and physical
layers and later combined in the cross-layer scheme to demonstrate the high secu-
rity level of the new scheme compared to separate implementations.
5.1 Cryptanalysis at the application layer
The RSA public key cryptography is implemented at the application layer. The
most successful method to break the RSA cryptosystem is the Number Field Sieve
(NFS) method used for partial key exposure attacks. The NFS is based on a method
known as “Fermat Factorization”: one tries to find integers x, y, such that x2  y2
mod n but x 6¼  y mod n [15]. We assume that the two primes p and q should be
close and approximately equal to the square root of n, where n = p.q. If one of the
integers could be written as x = (p + q)/2 then number of steps, S1 required to
determine the other integer, y could be computed as follows [24].
S1 ¼ pþ q
2
 ffiffiffinp ¼ ffiffiffiqp  ffiffiffipp
 2
2
¼
ffiffiffi
n
p  pð Þ2
2 p
(10)
It is partial key exposure attack since the number of steps, S1 required for the
attack depends on one of the primes.
Table 5 gives a summary of the number of steps required to break the traditional
RSA cryptography implemented at the application layer using Fermat Factorization.
5.2 Cryptanalysis at the physical layer
Security at the physical layer is ensured by the multi-level convolutional cryp-
tosystem which encrypts already encrypted data emanating from the RNS-based
RSA. The cryptanalysis of the multi-level convolutional cryptosystem will be based
on the ciphertext-only attack whereby, it is assumed that the attacker knows
ciphertext of several messages encrypted with the same key and/or several keys.
The keys used in the encryption are those mentioned in Section 2.1.2 for the non-
linear (8, 8, 2) 2-cascaded convolutional cryptosystem.
It is shown in [15] that, for an (n, k, L) convolutional code, each generator
matrix reveals at most p – k – 1 values of a private parameter, using Gaussian
elimination for p blocks of input data. Hence, if q is the number of states, then to
completely break the (k, k, L) N-cascaded cryptosystem, the minimum number of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs (u, v) required is [15].
Operand key length Total number of steps
16-bit 1
32-bit 1
64-bit 1.8  108
128-bit 8.0  1017
256-bit 1.26  1025
512-bit 2.53  1063
1024-bit 3.3  10140
Table 5.
Number of steps required to break the traditional RSA.
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S2 ¼ p: q:2
k
p k 1
q:2k
p
 k!
p
 1
p
 k
2
 	2
 22
& ’" #N8<
:
9=
; (11)
For an (8, 8, 2) 2-cascaded cryptosystem, k = 8 and the least number of
plaintext-ciphertext blocks required is p = 10 due to the number of rows and
columns in the generator matrix. Assuming q = 2 states, S2 could be as
S2 ¼ 10: 2:2
8
10 8 1
2:28
10
 8!
10
 1
10
 8
2
 	2
 22
& ’" #28<
:
9=
; ¼ 7:8 1034 (12)
Table 6 gives a summary of the number of steps required to break the (8, 8, 2)
2-cascaded cryptosystem using ciphertext-only attack.
5.3 Cryptanalysis of the new cross-layer security scheme
At the upper layer, huge key lengths such as 1024 bits and 2048 bits are used to
implement the RSA. Such implementations will greatly compromise throughput at
the physical layer due to modular exponentiation. Hence, the main objective of the
new cross-layer security scheme is to increase security level at the physical layer
despite the small valued data points transmitted derived from the RNS-based RSA
in order to enhance throughput. Cryptanalysis is performed on the small residue
RSA encrypted values. The analysis will be based on partial key exposure and
ciphertext-only attacks at the physical layer for eavesdropper who could wiretap the
transmitted data. The number of steps, S required to break the new cross-layer
security scheme should be a product of S1 and S2 given as [15].
S ¼ S1: p: q:2
k
p k 1
q:2k
p
 k!
p
 1
p
 k
2
 	2
 22
& ’" #N8<
:
9=
; (13)
Table 7 gives a summary of the number of steps required to break the new
cross-layer security scheme by using partial key exposure attack and ciphertext-
only attacks for different cascaded stages.
Comparing Tables 5–7, it can be seen that high security levels comparable to the
traditional 1024-bit RSA implemented at the upper layer could be attained using
short operand key lengths of 128 bits and 256 bits for cross-layer security
Operand key length Total number of steps
8-bit 7.8  1034
16-bit 2.1  1057
32-bit 1.4  1057
64-bit 1.5  1062
128-bit 6.1  1071
256-bit 9.87  1087
512-bit 2.68  10112
1024-bit 1.42  10134
Table 6.
Number of steps required to break the (8, 8, 2) 2-cascaded cryptosystem.
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implemented at the physical layer. It is worth noting that, the security level could be
much higher compared to the values displayed in Table 7 if the S-boxes were
implemented using 4-bit and 8-bit shuffling instead of the aforementioned 2-bit
shuffling.
6. Data throughput quantification
The data throughput, T could be given as [25].
T ¼ R 1–Peð ÞN (14)
where Pe is the bit error probability, N is the number of bits in the block length
and R is a fixed transmission rate for the frames. For Pe << 1, the throughput could
approximate to
T ffi R 1–NPeð Þ (15)
From (Eq. (15)) it could be seen that, for a fixed transmission rate, R the
throughput, T could be increased by either minimizing N or Pe. In this section, it
will be shown how convolutional coding could be used to achieve both conditions
through orthogonal signaling and forward error correction respectively.
6.1 Coded orthogonal signaling
It is shown in [18, 19] that, for coded orthogonal signaling, the bit error proba-
bility to transmit k-bit symbols is as follows:
Pb≤
2k‐1
2k  1
 	
∑
2k
3
ad
4 1þ kL γb
 
2þ kL γb
 2
" #L
(16)
where ad denotes the number of paths of distance d from the all-zero path which
merge with the all-zero path for the first time and dfree = 3 in this case, is the
minimum distance of the code. dfree is also equal to the diversity, L. γb is the average
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) per bit [18]. For each convolutional code, the transfer
function is obtained and the sum of the coefficients {ad} calculated.
Operand key length Total number of steps
N = 2 N = 3 N = 4
16-bit 2.1  1057 9.6  1085 4.4  10114
32-bit 1.4  1057 5.2  1085 1.9  10114
64-bit 1.5  1062 1.8  1093 2.3  10124
128-bit 6.1  1071 4.8  10107 3.7  10143
256-bit 9.87  1087 9.8  10131 9.7  10175
512-bit 2.68  10112 4.4  10168 7.2  10224
Table 7.
Number of steps required to break the cross-layer security scheme.
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For illustrative purposes, the transfer function, T(D) of smaller convolutional
codes such as (2, 2, 2) and (4, 4, 2) will be used.
The transfer function T(D) for the (2, 2, 2) code is given as follows [19]:
T Dð Þ ¼ D3 þ 2 D4 þ (17)
The transfer function for the (4, 4, 2) code is given as follows [19]:
T Dð Þ ¼ D3 þ 2D4 þ 3D5 þ 5D6 þ 9D7 þ 16D8 þ 28D9 þ 49D10 þ 85D11 þ
(18)
For both the (2, 2, 2) code and the (4, 4, 2) code, dfree = L = 3. Using the values of
L and {ad}, the probability of a binary digit error, Pb as a function of the SNR per bit,
γb is shown in Figure 7 for k = 2 and 4 [19].
The curves illustrate that, the error probability increases with an increase in k
for the same value of SNR. Hence, better performance for wireless transmission
should involve lower order codes and many independent parallel channels rather
than higher order codes with fewer independent parallel channels. Hence, high data
throughput could be attained by using small number of bits in the block length, N.
6.2 Forward error correction (FEC) code
The Viterbi algorithm [18] is the most extensively decoding algorithm for
Convolutional codes and has been widely deployed for forward error correction in
wireless communication systems. In this sub-section Viterbi algorithm will be
applied to the non-linear convolutional code. The constraint length, L for a (n,k,m)
convolutional code is given as L = k(m-1). The constraint length is very essential in
convolutional encoding since a Trellis diagram which gives the best encoding rep-
resentation populates after L bits. Hence to encode blocks of n bits, each block has
to be terminated by L zeros (0 s) before encoding.
Figure 7.
Performance of coded orthogonal signaling for k = 2 and k = 4.
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For illustrative purposes, a non-linear (4,2,3) convolutional code will be used to
demonstrate encoding and Viterbi decoding. A possible non-linear (4,2,3)
convolutional code showing mod-2 connections and the product cipher is shown in
Figure 8.
6.2.1 Example: encode/decode the message M = 10,011
• Encoding process
The constraint length, L = k(m-1) = 2(3–1) = 4.
Hence 4 zeros will be appended to message M before encoding. The modified
message becomes M’ = 10110000. Transition tables in appendix are used to encode
the modified message.
a. Using transition tables in appendix, the transmitted sequence from the 1st
stage is given as Tin = 10 01 01 11
b.S-box output is given as S = 00 11 11 01
c. P-box output is given as P = 00 11 11 10
d.Transmitted sequence into the 2nd stage is given as P = 00 11 11 10
e. Using transition tables in appendix, the final transmitted sequence which is the
output bits from the 2nd stage is given as Tout = 0000 1111 0101 1001
• Viterbi decoding process
In performing the Viterbi algorithm, a bit in the sequence Tout will be altered. Let
the received sequence be TR = 1000 1111 0101 1001 instead of Tout = 0000 1111 0101
1001. The Viterbi algorithm applied to the 2nd stage is summarized in Table 8.
Figure 8.
2-stage non-linear (4,2,3) convolutional code.
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The bits above the arrows will constitute the retrieved sequence from the 2nd
stage. Hence, the retrieved sequence is given as, R1 = 00 11 11 10. This sequence is
fed to the P-box.
• P-box output is given as P1 = 00 11 11 01. Sequence, P1 is fed to the S-box
• S-box output is given as S1 = 10 01 01 11
Sequence, S1 is fed into the 1st stage to retrieve the final correct message. The
Viterbi algorithm applied to the 1st stage is summarized in Table 9.
For a good trellis, the final state is the all-zero state as seen in the winning path in
Table 9. The final received sequence is identical to the original transmitted message
of M’ = Rfinal = 10110000 despite the first bit error. Hence, using the non-linear
convolutional code, the error bit was identified and corrected. The forward error
correction capability will therefore enhance throughput, since the bit error rate, Pe
is reduced.
Table 8.
Viterbi algorithm applied to 2nd stage of (4,2,3) code.
Table 9.
Viterbi algorithm applied to 1st stage of (4,2,3) code.
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7. Security attacks in wireless networks
Most attacks in wireless networks are classified into two categories: passive and
active. Passive attacks such as eavesdropping and traffic analysis do not interfere
with normal network operations as opposed to active attacks. Some of the attacks
could be circumvented by the cross-layer security scheme presented in this research
due to the following characteristics inherent in its implementation:
• RSA cryptographic algorithm at the upper layer: Table 3 summarized the
security services, which could be achieved by implementing RSA cryptography
such as authentication, non-repudiation and confidentiality. These services are
essential network security requirements which are vital in curbing attacks such
as eavesdropping, masquerade attack and information disclosure since there
will be a possibility of not attaining the final all-zero state if message is
modified.
• Convolutional cryptosystem at the physical layer: The different keys generated
are essential in ensuring confidentiality while the forward error correction
capability is essential in curbing message modification attack.
Other attacks such as denial of service and replay attack could be circumvented
if the cross-layer security scheme is associated with Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP).
8. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have described a new cross-layer security scheme which has
the advantage of enhancing both security and throughput as opposed to existing
schemes which either enhances security or throughput but not both. The new
scheme is implemented using the residue number system (RNS), non-linear
convolutional coding and subband coding at the physical layer and RSA cryptogra-
phy at the upper layers. By using RSA cryptography, the scheme could be used in
encryption, authentication and non-repudiation with efficient key management as
opposed to existing schemes, which had poor key management for large wireless
networks since their implementation, was based on symmetric encryption tech-
niques. Results show that, the new algorithm exhibits high security level for key
sizes of 64, 128 and 256 bits when using three or more convolutional-cascaded
stages. The security level is far above the traditional 1024-bit RSA which is already
vulnerable. The vulnerability of 1024-bit RSA has led to the proposal of
implementing higher levels such as 2048-bit and 4096-bit. These high level RSA
schemes when implemented will greatly compromise throughput due to modular
exponentiation. Hence the usefulness of a scheme such as the one presented in this
chapter. In addition, Viterbi algorithm was performed for the new non-linear
convolutional code in order to highlight the error correction capability. It was
shown that, by using error correction codes on many small block lengths compared
to one huge block length, throughput increases. Hence non-linear convolutional
code is very critical in the implementation of the new scheme, since it contributes in
enhancing both security and throughput. The entire scheme could be implemented
at different access points in a wireless network since it fits in a single FPGA. Finally,
the new cross-layer security scheme is essential in circumventing some attacks in
wireless and computer networks.
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A. Appendix: transition tables
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